תוהו ובוהו האט געשריבן:גאר אינטערסאנט איז, אז א ריזיג חלק איוב ''פארענטפערט'' די שאלה מיטן טענה'נען להד''ם און ס'גאר פארקערט (און איוב איז בעצם א חוטא וכו' וכו').
(ערגעץ וואו אין איוב, ברענגט איינער גאר א ''ראיה'' צו השגחת האל פון דעם אז ''צדיק וטוב לו רשע ורע לו ע''כ שיש משגיח''..)
תוהו ובוהו האט געשריבן:ווען אין ספרי קודש שטייט ''גוט'' מיינט דאס גוט פארוועם עס קומט זיך, אין אנדערע ווערטער; ס'גייט בשילוב מיט ''צדיק''..
איי געס די שאלה איז נאר אויב מ'איז מגדיר ''גוט'' איינער וואס וויל נאר גורם זיין הנאה.. (וואס איז א לכאורה א סתירה מיט צדיק).
כ'ווייס נישט ווי דו האסט געטראפן אזא גאט, אין ספרי קודש לכאורה נישט, אין ספרי קודש געפינען מיר א אלמעכטיגער גאט וואס באגיסט זיינע פריינט (צדיקים?) מיט רעגן אין ניצחון, און אינטערדרוקט זיינע פיינט עד לעפר.
אין איין ווארט; אין תנ''ך איז פונקט אזוי אידיעל נקמה אינעם אויב השם ווי הטבה פארן אוהב השם..
מי אני האט געשריבן:וואס [tag]תוהו ובוהו[/tag] מיינט איז טאמער נעמט מען אָן אז בחירה איז אן אינטרינסיק בּעיסיק טוב איז יש מקום לומר אז דאס זאל איבערוועגן די מציאות פון רעות וואס קומען ע״כ ארויס דערפון ע״י רוע בחירתן של אנשים - די מעגליכקייט וואס די ״טוב״ פון עצם בחירה ברענגט צו. (דר. עלווין פּלענטינגאַ איז א שטארקע דוגל פון דעם מהלך.) דאס איז וואס אנבאלאנגט רעות וואס קומען צושטאנד דורך די עידזשענסי פון א מענטש [סוג ב׳ וג׳ מהרעות שכלל הרמב״ם]. ולגבי די רעות וואס קומען צושטאנד מהטבע [סוג א׳], וואס די אגענט נעמט מען אָן עפ״י טעאיזם איז הקב״ה, אויב קומט דאס אויף רשעים קען מען דאס אויך פארשטיין ווייל דאס איז אויך א פועל יוצא פון די עצם ״טוב״ פון בחירה וואס מ׳האט אנגענומען כנ״ל; עס איז די עונש על רוע בחירתן. אויב אבער איז די סארט רעות על הצדיק דאן ווערט נולד די קשיא ווייל ער האט דאך יא גוט בוחר געווען.
berlbalaguleh האט געשריבן:פארוואס א טרענספארמער ארבעט נישט אויף די. סי. ...?!
The square circle example you bring up still doesn't answer anything. The reason a square circle is impossible is because god made a square and a circle different. According to this logic, he has to have made free will intrinsically good, and the alternative bad, but our sense of the word "bad" is referring to pain, which God inflicted opon us by making free will a intrinsically good thing. If God was ALL good, then he wouldn't have made free will, a partly bad thing, into a intrinsically good thing.מי אני האט געשריבן:[left]If it is conceded and agreed that Free Will is an intrinsic good per se and that it outweighs the evils that inevitably arise due to said freedom of choice, then it can be argued that creating Free Will [the “Good”] without the subsequent evils that arise due to its utilization is an internal and logical contradiction. In which case it does not fall within the remit of “possible” and is not within the purview of G-d’s omnipotence; it’d be akin to His “inability” to create a square circle. This is unless one advances a quasi-Frankfurtian position in which Free Will is logically concordant with the inability to actually fulfill an evil choice; cf. Dr. Andrea Weissberger and others. Though, in that case, the philosophical burden of proof has seemingly shifted to those opposing said Theodicy.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.[/left]
שארפןקאפ האט געשריבן:עיין כאן.berlbalaguleh האט געשריבן:פארוואס א טרענספארמער ארבעט נישט אויף די. סי. ...?!
https://www.electricalclassroom.com/dc- ... rmer-coil/
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On your second paragraph, if you say that God can't be viewed in a logical way, then there's no reason to say anything about him at all. Any logical conclusions about God, like he wants us to do mitsvos, are intrinsically false, because a human could never understand God. So there's no reason to do anything for God, because you are using human logic, which can't be used for god.מי אני האט געשריבן:[left]If it is conceded and agreed that Free Will is an intrinsic good per se and that it outweighs the evils that inevitably arise due to said freedom of choice, then it can be argued that creating Free Will [the “Good”] without the subsequent evils that arise due to its utilization is an internal and logical contradiction. In which case it does not fall within the remit of “possible” and is not within the purview of G-d’s omnipotence; it’d be akin to His “inability” to create a square circle. This is unless one advances a quasi-Frankfurtian position in which Free Will is logically concordant with the inability to actually fulfill an evil choice; cf. Dr. Andrea Weissberger and others. Though, in that case, the philosophical burden of proof has seemingly shifted to those opposing said Theodicy.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.[/left]
ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:If God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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If you think he does bad things, then there's no reason to worship him. What if he lied to you about heaven and hell? This is clearly false.ליב צו וויסן האט געשריבן:ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:If God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:On your second paragraph, if you say that God can't be viewed in a logical way, then there's no reason to say anything about him at all. Any logical conclusions about God, like he wants us to do mitsvos, are intrinsically false, because a human could never understand God. So there's no reason to do anything for God, because you are using human logic, which can't be used for god.מי אני האט געשריבן:[left]If it is conceded and agreed that Free Will is an intrinsic good per se and that it outweighs the evils that inevitably arise due to said freedom of choice, then it can be argued that creating Free Will [the “Good”] without the subsequent evils that arise due to its utilization is an internal and logical contradiction. In which case it does not fall within the remit of “possible” and is not within the purview of G-d’s omnipotence; it’d be akin to His “inability” to create a square circle. This is unless one advances a quasi-Frankfurtian position in which Free Will is logically concordant with the inability to actually fulfill an evil choice; cf. Dr. Andrea Weissberger and others. Though, in that case, the philosophical burden of proof has seemingly shifted to those opposing said Theodicy.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.[/left]
ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:The square circle example you bring up still doesn't answer anything. The reason a square circle is impossible is because god made a square and a circle different. According to this logic, he has to have made free will intrinsically good, and the alternative bad, but our sense of the word "bad" is referring to pain, which God inflicted opon us by making free will a intrinsically good thing. If God was ALL good, then he wouldn't have made free will, a partly bad thing, into a intrinsically good thing.
ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:If you think he does bad things, then there's no reason to worship him. What if he lied to you about heaven and hell? This is clearly false.ליב צו וויסן האט געשריבן:ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:If God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
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ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:If you think he does bad things, then there's no reason to worship him. What if he lied to you about heaven and hell? This is clearly false.ליב צו וויסן האט געשריבן:ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:If God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
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ליב צו וויסן האט געשריבן:לויט די אידישע רעליגיע דינט מען אים נישט ווייל מען "וויל" (און מען פארשטייט אים...), נאר ווייל מען "מוז".
ליב צו וויסן האט געשריבן:ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
But he could not only lie about that, what if he's lieing about what's right and wrong? Again, this is clearly false.מצפצף האט געשריבן:ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:If you think he does bad things, then there's no reason to worship him. What if he lied to you about heaven and hell? This is clearly false.ליב צו וויסן האט געשריבן:ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:If God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
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אל תהיו כעבדים המשמשים את הרב על מנת לקבל פרס
On your last point, if God can't do everything, that means that God is not infinite. This could entail that God has a God above him.מי אני האט געשריבן:ליב צו וויסן האט געשריבן:לויט די אידישע רעליגיע דינט מען אים נישט ווייל מען "וויל" (און מען פארשטייט אים...), נאר ווייל מען "מוז".
און דעם "מוז" קען מען זאגן איז ענליך צום "מוז" פארוואס מען "מוז" זיך אויפירן מאראליש (אפילו אָן אן עוואלושינערי/ציוויליזאציע פערספעקטיוו) צו וואס אטעאיסטן קענען אויך מודה זיין. אין אנדערע ווערטער, מ'היט די מצוות ווייל מען גלייבט אז דאס איז די ריכטיגע זאך צו טוהן (כדי צוצוקומען און באגרייפן מושכלות וכו' וכו' וכדומה) אפגעזעהן פון "רצון" ה' וואס מ'קען טענה'ן האט נישט קיין געהעריגע באדייט אזוי-צי-אזוי וכנ"ל. און איה"נ, די שאלה פון "וואס טוהט גראַוּנדן אט די גלויבונג?" איז טאקע א שווערע שאלה פאר זיך. (מ'דארף אבער אין אכט נעמען אז די אנאלאגוס שאלה, אין אונזער קאנטעקסט, פון "וואס טוהט גראַוּנדן אט די גלויבונג אין סתם מאראליטעט, בפרט טאמער וויל מען אננעמען א מאראלישע ריעליזם?" איז אויך א שווערע [פילאזאפישע] שאלה.)ליב צו וויסן האט געשריבן:ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
דא האב איך טאקע אראפגעברענגט אז הקב"ה הוא "תכלית הטוב" איז נישט קיין עיקר בעצם, אבער פונקט אזוי טרעפן מיר נישט אז "כל יכול" זאל זיין אן עיקר (לפי הרמב"ם בעיקריו).
On your first paragraph, if you concede that we can't think of God in a logical way, then there's no way to know if we should follow him. We don't even know what he wants/needs us to do, because we're thinking of "want"/"need" in a logical way.מי אני האט געשריבן:ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:On your second paragraph, if you say that God can't be viewed in a logical way, then there's no reason to say anything about him at all. Any logical conclusions about God, like he wants us to do mitsvos, are intrinsically false, because a human could never understand God. So there's no reason to do anything for God, because you are using human logic, which can't be used for god.מי אני האט געשריבן:[left]If it is conceded and agreed that Free Will is an intrinsic good per se and that it outweighs the evils that inevitably arise due to said freedom of choice, then it can be argued that creating Free Will [the “Good”] without the subsequent evils that arise due to its utilization is an internal and logical contradiction. In which case it does not fall within the remit of “possible” and is not within the purview of G-d’s omnipotence; it’d be akin to His “inability” to create a square circle. This is unless one advances a quasi-Frankfurtian position in which Free Will is logically concordant with the inability to actually fulfill an evil choice; cf. Dr. Andrea Weissberger and others. Though, in that case, the philosophical burden of proof has seemingly shifted to those opposing said Theodicy.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.[/left]
[left]True (assuming you accept the first horn of the argument). Although, technically you don’t necessarily have to resort to the preclusion of Logic from the domain of G-d, for this theological difficulty to arise. Meaning, a Negative/Apophatic Theology with regard to G-d and His attributes subsequently entails (some form of) Theological Non-Cognitivism: statements with regard to “His Will” and “His Commandments” are ultimately vacuous. The way one reconciles this difficulty with religious observance can possibly serve to assuage as well this difficulty in the framework of Absolute Omnipotence and the logical preclusion it entails.[/left]ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:The square circle example you bring up still doesn't answer anything. The reason a square circle is impossible is because god made a square and a circle different. According to this logic, he has to have made free will intrinsically good, and the alternative bad, but our sense of the word "bad" is referring to pain, which God inflicted opon us by making free will a intrinsically good thing. If God was ALL good, then he wouldn't have made free will, a partly bad thing, into a intrinsically good thing.
[left]The idea is that it is the essences of the square and circle that preclude them from being in the same substrate in tandem. Now, if one is to accede that Free Will is an intrinsic “Good”, to an extent that it outweighs the evils that can arise when one abuses it which is within its essence of what defines “Free” Will, then stating that He should create Free Will without creating evils is the same contradiction in terms. You can argue that He shouldn’t have created Free Will at all, but in that case this “Good”, which has been conceded outweighs its associated evils, would have been lacking in Creation. In other words, you can’t have one without the other, just as you can’t have a square without its “edginess”.
You can still argue that Free Will is not an intrinsic “Good”; at least insofar as outweighing the evils that accrue as a consequence.[/left]
According to the Oxford dictionary, omnipotence =infinite (power).מי אני האט געשריבן:[left]Please explain how:
~Not omnipotent → Not infinite
I don’t see how it necessarily follows. I don’t claim it’s a non-sequitur, I just don’t understand. Unless it’s with regard to power. In which case it’d seem to be a tautology : “not a nfinite in .
(This is all the more so if we don’t deny Omnipotence; we just limit its definition. Meaning, He has power as far as power is logically applicable by His essence etc.).[/left]