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Like I said, a tautology. "Infinite" with regard to power". Though, it seems superfluous to the argument you're advancing. Namely, if He's not omnipotent then maybe there's a being with greater power. I don't see a reason to include a clause of infinity in the argument

מי אני האט געשריבן:Like I said, a tautology. "Infinite" with regard to power". Though, it seems superfluous to the argument you're advancing. Namely, if He's not omnipotent then maybe there's a being with greater power. I don't see a reason to include a clause of infinity in the argument

Right[emoji106]

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But I still want to have a answer.

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ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:On your first paragraph, if you concede that we can't think of God in a logical way, then there's no way to know if we should follow him. We don't even know what he wants/needs us to do, because we're thinking of "want"/"need" in a logical way.

Like I said, the Theological Non-Cognitivism and Problem of Religious Language difficulties which arise even without this logical impediment.

Sort of asked and answered with the (admittedly tenuous) analogy to Moral Realism and its grounding.

ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:On your second paragraph, I never said that God should create free will, but without the evil, I said that he shouldn't have created free will in the first place.

Like I said, you can reject the "intrinsic Good of Free Will" defense, based on denying the felicity of Free Will over its consequent evils.

ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:But I still want to have a answer.

I guess if Omnipotence is not completely denied (as I stated in parentheses) just redefined in such a way so as to still retain the maximal power logically allowed, then this precludes a superior being. This can allow as well to retain "infinite power" with regard to its [logically infinite] maximization

מי אני האט געשריבן:

ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:On your first paragraph, if you concede that we can't think of God in a logical way, then there's no way to know if we should follow him. We don't even know what he wants/needs us to do, because we're thinking of "want"/"need" in a logical way.

Like I said, the Theological Non-Cognitivism and Problem of Religious Language difficulties which arise even if without this logical impediment.

Sort of asked and answered with the (admittedly tenuous) analogy to Moral Realism.

ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:On your second paragraph, I never said that God should create free will, but without the evil, I said that he shouldn't have created free will in the first place.

Like I said, you can reject the "intrinsic Good of Free Will" defense, based on denying the felicity of Free Will over its consequent evils.

A agree with both, but now: why should we do things for God if we can't understand him logically? Secondly, why did God create free will?
(By the way, you have excellent grammar)

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מי אני האט געשריבן:דא האב איך טאקע אראפגעברענגט אז הקב"ה הוא "תכלית הטוב" איז נישט קיין עיקר בעצם, אבער פונקט אזוי טרעפן מיר נישט אז "כל יכול" זאל זיין אן עיקר (לפי הרמב"ם בעיקריו).

מ'מוז אפילו נישט צורירן דעם ''תכלית הטוב''.
ס'ווענדט זיך אין די דעפיניציע פון ''טוב'', אויב טוב מיינט אזא מאדערנע וועלטס אויסקוק ווי האבן ווייטאג איז ע''כ רע, דאן פעלט מעגליך אין תכלית הטוב, אבער אזא סארט טוב איז לכאורה בכלל נישט אידיאל אין תנ''ך'ס וועלט-אויסקוק.

אין אנדערע ווערטער געבן גוטס פאר א רשע ווערט מעגליך בכלל נישט אנגערופן ''טוב'' אין תנ''ך'ס ווערטער-בוך, און דעריבער טוט גאטס פארשניידן רשעים בכלל נישט אינטערמינעווען ''תכלית הטוב'' (נאר מעגליך עס גאר פארשטערקערן ווייל טוב פאר א רשע איז מעגליך ''רע''..)

כ'האב עס דארט אונטערגעלאנט אז מען וויל נישט, עכ"פ לפי הרמב"ם (בח"ג פט"ז), אונטערמינעווען דעם פארשטאנד פון "טוב" לגביו כביכול פון אונזער פערסעפשאן און הגדרה פון וואס "טוב" מיינט: א "מאראלישער" סארט "טוב".

מי אני האט געשריבן:כ'האב עס דארט אונטערגעלאנט אז מען וויל נישט, עכ"פ לפי הרמב"ם (בח"ג פט"ז), אונטערמינעווען דעם פארשטאנד פון "טוב" לגביו כביכול פון אונזער פערסעפשאן און הגדרה פון וואס "טוב" מיינט: א "מאראלישער" סארט "טוב".

ס'איז אבער נישט מאראל צו אריינלייגן מענטשן אין א unnecessary challenge.

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ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן: .

A agree with both, but now: why should we do things for God if we can't understand him logically? Secondly, why did God create free will?
(By the way, you have excellent grammar)[/quote]
[left]Thank you!.

To answer the first question I’d say, from a philosophical theological perspective, that you do not follow them [precepts etc.] “for G-d”: the statement is “empty”. What grounds it is, I guess, “Revelation”, though this itself obviously needs to be (re)defined.

With regard to the second question, it seems that it implies as premises both an acceptance of the existence (for lack of a better term) of G-d, as well as a rejection of (at least Hard) Determinism. In which case it would seem that in order to maintain consistency, one will seemingly be compelled to assert that Free Will IS an intrinsic Good, despite its consequently resulting evils. This thus justifies its creation. Alternatively, one can possibly argue that it is a logical impossibility to create Man qua Man without Free Will. (Seemingly analogous to the intuitive Deterministic position, where Man qua Man will inevitably have the intuitive illusion of Free Will.) In which case, one need not concede that Free Will is an intrinsic Good despite assenting to the two aforementioned premises.[/left]

ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:

מי אני האט געשריבן:כ'האב עס דארט אונטערגעלאנט אז מען וויל נישט, עכ"פ לפי הרמב"ם (בח"ג פט"ז), אונטערמינעווען דעם פארשטאנד פון "טוב" לגביו כביכול פון אונזער פערסעפשאן און הגדרה פון וואס "טוב" מיינט: א "מאראלישער" סארט "טוב".

ס'איז אבער נישט מאראל צו אריינלייגן מענטשן אין א unnecessary challenge.

איה״נ. אבער דאס איז אננעמענדיג אז ס׳וואלט געווען מעגליך אנדערש אין די זאך אליין וככל הנ״ל.

Can I clarify what you need to (re)define?

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In short, “Revelation” is seemingly what grounds one’s commitment to “G-d’s” (for lack of a better term) commandments. However, this itself is seemingly fraught with difficulties owing to the aforementioned non-cognitivism etc. associated with language in reference to G-d. Thus, in order to avoid this difficulty the theist can possibly (re)define “Revelation” as one’s fideistic and purely subjective assent to the veracity (again for lack of a better term) of said said commandments etc. This is thus what grounds his commitment. (This can seemingly segue into existentialism in general and its associated philosophical strands.)

מי אני האט געשריבן:In short, “Revelation” is seemingly what grounds one’s commitment to “G-d’s” (for lack of a better term) commandments. However, this itself is seemingly fraught with difficulties owing to the aforementioned non-cognitivism etc. associated with language in reference to G-d. Thus, in order to avoid this difficulty the theist can possibly (re)define “Revelation” as one’s fideistic and purely subjective assent to the veracity (again for lack of a better term) of said said commandments etc. This is thus what grounds his commitment. (This can seemingly segue into existentialism in general and its associated philosophical strands.)

Why would you go in a fideistic approach? Isn't the way to figure out the truth by looking against your biases, and not look for conformation?

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Because that precisely how you become an apikoros

ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:

מי אני האט געשריבן:In short, “Revelation” is seemingly what grounds one’s commitment to “G-d’s” (for lack of a better term) commandments. However, this itself is seemingly fraught with difficulties owing to the aforementioned non-cognitivism etc. associated with language in reference to G-d. Thus, in order to avoid this difficulty the theist can possibly (re)define “Revelation” as one’s fideistic and purely subjective assent to the veracity (again for lack of a better term) of said said commandments etc. This is thus what grounds his commitment. (This can seemingly segue into existentialism in general and its associated philosophical strands.)

Why would you go in a fideistic approach? Isn't the way to figure out the truth by looking against your biases, and not look for conformation?

I fully acknowledge and admit that it’s a form of Belief Perseverance and highly apologetic in nature. Though, in its defense, this in-and-of-itself has no bearing on the actual truth value of the claim defended.

מי אני האט געשריבן:

ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:

מי אני האט געשריבן:In short, “Revelation” is seemingly what grounds one’s commitment to “G-d’s” (for lack of a better term) commandments. However, this itself is seemingly fraught with difficulties owing to the aforementioned non-cognitivism etc. associated with language in reference to G-d. Thus, in order to avoid this difficulty the theist can possibly (re)define “Revelation” as one’s fideistic and purely subjective assent to the veracity (again for lack of a better term) of said said commandments etc. This is thus what grounds his commitment. (This can seemingly segue into existentialism in general and its associated philosophical strands.)

Why would you go in a fideistic approach? Isn't the way to figure out the truth by looking against your biases, and not look for conformation?

I fully acknowledge and admit that it’s a form of Belief Perseverance and highly apologetic in nature. Though, in its defense, this in-and-of-itself has no bearing on the actual truth value of the claim defended.

No, it does. You're talking about possible answers(like the possibility to redefine "revelation"), not concrete answers. The only reason to KNOW it's true is because of your already existing belief, which is, as you said, a form of belief perseverance.

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רביה''ק זי''ע האט געשריבן:Because that precisely how you become an apikoros

And that's precisely how you don't answer a question.

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Don't you see for yourself that you're dealing with people who are more concerned with the perseverance of their beliefs than with the objective truth? What kind of a question is this "Why don't you try to look past your biases"?! They don't want to look past their biases because they want to maintain their belief system and way of life

רביה''ק זי''ע האט געשריבן:Don't you see for yourself that you're dealing with people who are more concerned with the perseverance of their beliefs than with the objective truth? What kind of a question is this "Why don't you try to look past your biases"?! They don't want to look past their biases because they want to maintain their belief system and way of life

I didn't say "why don't YOU try to look past your biases." I just wondered, for me, how to look at the world, that's it.

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Ok, so if that's the question then you can look at the world however and whichever way you want, philosophy and theology is just bs confirmation bias hodge podge from very smart and educated white men, as it says in the verse: Philosophy is just white guys j**king off

רביה''ק זי''ע האט געשריבן:Ok, so if that's the question then you can look at the world however and whichever way you want, philosophy and theology is just bs confirmation bias hodge podge from very smart and educated white men, as it says in the verse: Philosophy is just white guys j**king off

Right, but if I just look for meaning myself, then it's a even bigger conformation bias hodge podge, let me live with abit less hodge podge.

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ונהפך הוא האט געשריבן:[d ]No, it does. You're talking about possible answers(like the possibility to redefine "revelation"), not concrete answers. The only reason to KNOW it's true is because of your already existing belief, which is, as you said, a form of belief perseverance.

There seem to be two disparate arguments here:

1). That due to the answers/positions being advanced stemming from the theist’s preconceived biases, and not an objective seeking of truth, this in-and-of-itself negates the warrant of said belief being defended. This was implied in the earlier post. To which I replied that this is not the case; it is a form of an Appeal to Motive/Bulverism fallacy.

2). Questioning the warrant of Fideism; if belief in divinity is properly basic. This I understand to be implied by the second post. If Plantinga’s position is cogent that it IS properly basic [“I KNOW [read “believe”] it’s true because of my already existing belief”], then I fail to see how resorting to redefinitions of popular conceptions within Theism, to which the individual theist has never assented, in-and-of-themselves serve to undermine said existing belief, if they are not proven to be inconsistent with his fideistic accepted belief. You have not shown it to be so. The claim that the theist cannot provide demonstrative and conclusive rebuttals [my understanding of “concrete” in this context] does not negate their truth-value if the objections levied against his beliefs are not demonstrative in their own right. Or alternatively, if his rebuttals serve, at the very least, to undermine the demonstrativeness of his opponent’s arguments.